C Darwin - That article has noting of substance.
Chrisb - Yes, exactly. Old names in aviation that have dabbled or even competed in commercial aviation now only supply military contracts to great profit. Commercial aviation is a game of incredible capital expenditures for fantastically thin profits.
Chrisb - Yes, exactly. Old names in aviation that have dabbled or even competed in commercial aviation now only supply military contracts to great profit. Commercial aviation is a game of incredible capital expenditures for fantastically thin profits.
And the vision of Boeing helped Britain fight for freedom 1939 until 1945. So sad someone somewhere didn't care as much as it's founder. The Boeing 707 I have flown on in 1966. Something as remarkable to me now as then. Apart from the TV screen in the seat back it was exactly as now except seating space. Related to 737. A bumpy Landing as always the stewardess remarked. We had sweets to stop our ears popping.
Happy Christmas and hopefully an improved New Year for Boeing.
I watched a program recently about some Boeing workers who complained to management and then to FAA about poorly made parts for the 737.
Boeing said there wasnt a problem and FAA just ignored them having faith that Boeing would sort any problems.
A subcontractor was supposed to make metal panel parts exactly on a CNC machine but had them made by hand and the parts ended up having to be re-drilled and bashed into right shape by Boeing to fit.
They found on crashing the planes fell apart too easily.
Indeed. It's apparent that Boeing has several problems, but to its credit it got rid of one of them a week ago.
Well, as Charles points out if the problem(s) is/are a result of a long standing corporate culture, it’ll take a lot more than a game of musical chairs with the mid to upper management echelons to effect changes meaningful anywhere other than to the stock market evaluation. And since the vast majority of the public aren’t likely holding company shares, the only thing that really matters is whether the planes were flying on were designed with our safety in mind, or to maintain maximum profitability for the manufacturer by extending the lifespan of a half century old airframe platform, and to no small degree that of the airlines as well by eliminating the huge cost of training pilots for new type certification - which 6L6 has described already.
Not sure you can blame the airlines.
When the manufacturer and safety authorities tell them no major training is needed for their pilots to fly a new, more economical plane that is the one they will buy. I don't expect them to do their own research on that.
With the advent of low cost carriers the airline market is permanently squeezed and Boeing tried to profit from that situation.
When the manufacturer and safety authorities tell them no major training is needed for their pilots to fly a new, more economical plane that is the one they will buy. I don't expect them to do their own research on that.
With the advent of low cost carriers the airline market is permanently squeezed and Boeing tried to profit from that situation.
Charles, the point I was trying to make is that the airlines do have several reasons to put pressure on Boeing to maintain the same “type” rating for all models the 737 in their fleets. Not the least of which are the scheduling nightmares of having to juggle an ever declining roster of qualified pilots when retraining / recertification for new type classes while the demand for flights continues to increase, and the not insignificant costs of the training itself. See 6L6’s comments earlier in this thread. Of course it’s just my unqualified opinion, but I can’t believe that this would not be a factor in Boeing’s misguided calculus.
I’ll once again refer you to Juan Browne - not a forum member - but I think at least as qualified as anyone hear to speak on any matter relating to commercial and private aviation. YouTube
All that said, there’s no question that the lion’s share of missteps made in the whole Max/MCAS fiasco were made by the questionable partnership of manufacturer and regulator - i.e. Boeing/FAA.
I’ll once again refer you to Juan Browne - not a forum member - but I think at least as qualified as anyone hear to speak on any matter relating to commercial and private aviation. YouTube
All that said, there’s no question that the lion’s share of missteps made in the whole Max/MCAS fiasco were made by the questionable partnership of manufacturer and regulator - i.e. Boeing/FAA.
It comes down to something very simple. It should have been possible to make the 737 Max opperate much like the previous series. That's the job of the software. This story reminds me of Windows 8 that was to me nothing like as good as Windows 7. 737 is a bit like playing chess. We expect the project leader to be a Grand Master and able to see all possible moves and outcomes. Even if no one person can do that they should be able to build a team that can. Using the Windows analogy XP seemed to anticipate what I would do next. 10 whilst being easy enough to me is less intuitive. Linux retains easy to use and took no thought to use it. Android also.
And you'd think it'd be a simple job for the manufacturer to tell the airlines and pilots - not all of whom could possibly be oblivious to the fact that the new much larger engines located far further forward than on all previous generations of the model would change the flight dynamics in certain operating conditions - what systems were developed to "assist" in those situations, and exactly what actions they should take, and how much time they'd have to do so.
Making an error alert on an undisclosed and non-redundant "augmentation" system a $60,000 option seems to me to an argument for as many class action lawsuits as necessary to force Boeing to fully retrofit all Max series at no cost to the airlines - once the FAA and other regulatory agencies re-certify them.
Making an error alert on an undisclosed and non-redundant "augmentation" system a $60,000 option seems to me to an argument for as many class action lawsuits as necessary to force Boeing to fully retrofit all Max series at no cost to the airlines - once the FAA and other regulatory agencies re-certify them.
As it's all in software they agreed about 6 months ago to make this a standard feature.
I had a long talk with a systems psychologist from NASA. He said his job was very simple. Make the spacecraft as easy to operate as possible. He put this down to cost of the item, the spacecraft too expensive to risk. His oppion was that airline pilots invariably took the blame for things NASA would try to design to work better. Even so a spacecraft requires remarkable astronauts to work. We did discuss fully robotic working. He thought it often just as good to have a human doing some of it. This was before all the problems at NASA.
I watched a TV program about planning permission in Italy. On the face of it a questionable system and a form of tax. Then the town major said in Italy one is always responsible for ones own property. No piece of paper exempts one. In my work we have to pass responsibility to a competent body. They can write certification in most countries or assist. One contact I was asked to sign seemed to make me the one who took responsibility. My solicitor said walk away. So I did. It was passed off as intellectual property rights. That's nonsense as in my way of being paid they automatically own that. If you understand what that means you might see how we got to where we are. People pay people to pass responsibility down the line. In my job I am a minor officer. My boss said ultimately it's his responsibility. Sure bankruptcy, that's not everything although is in this world.
A prototype I designed sailed through certification. I thought it needed more work. Asking the boss he thought I knew more than them. I know it's very safe. It just doesn't fit a specific standard. I was left feeling uneasy. In 2006 I found their rules almost impossible. I didn't so much learn the rules as what upsets them.
I watched a TV program about planning permission in Italy. On the face of it a questionable system and a form of tax. Then the town major said in Italy one is always responsible for ones own property. No piece of paper exempts one. In my work we have to pass responsibility to a competent body. They can write certification in most countries or assist. One contact I was asked to sign seemed to make me the one who took responsibility. My solicitor said walk away. So I did. It was passed off as intellectual property rights. That's nonsense as in my way of being paid they automatically own that. If you understand what that means you might see how we got to where we are. People pay people to pass responsibility down the line. In my job I am a minor officer. My boss said ultimately it's his responsibility. Sure bankruptcy, that's not everything although is in this world.
A prototype I designed sailed through certification. I thought it needed more work. Asking the boss he thought I knew more than them. I know it's very safe. It just doesn't fit a specific standard. I was left feeling uneasy. In 2006 I found their rules almost impossible. I didn't so much learn the rules as what upsets them.
I've been subscribed to the blancolirio channel since before this thread started
Going by the 737Max wiki page there were two cost options: 1. the AoA sensor 'disagree' warning and 2. a visualizer.
It appears the warning was non-functional without the visualizer.
It also seems that Boeing got away with fitting and originally not telling anybody about MCAS is by claiming it was already in common usage...in the 767-based tanker.
Firstly a military tanker plane is not what I understand as 'coomon use', secondly the Air Force is consistently rejecting delivery of the tankers because they are not up to agreed standards and thirdly i the 767 tanker MCAS is substantially less powerful.
I do not believe that airlines have put any direct pressure on Boeing.
Boeing knows what constraints airlines are under plus how many other 737 versions are in service and decided to exploit that situation rather than a new plane to nose ahead of Airbus in the sales game. Which to be fair and considering how old the 737 airframe is should have been nearly fully fledged on the drawing board (computer file) already.
Bottom line is that I apportion none of the blame to the airlines.
They just buy the planes which make the most economic sense to them and trust the various air safety authorities and the manufacturers. Consequently 100% of the blame is shared between Boeing and FAA.
The FAA failed to uphold their own standards and Boeing hoodwinked them at every corner possible.
And that is the airbus approach. But oddly until the 737max about as many Airbus as Boeing have crashed when both were in service. The numbers are still exceedingly low given the millions of passenger hours/miles per year. Nasa would would to have those sort of stats.
If at all plausible crashes will be blamed on human error.
However if there are two of the same new plane within months and both share an identical and extremely rare type of crash* it becomes very difficult to blame the pilots and get away with it.
I guess the length of the recertification process indicates the size of the underlying problem. If it were a simple software fix plus retrofitting the warning systems the Max would be flying by now.
*Off the top of my head I can't think of another crash where a passenger plane drilled vertically into the ground/sea at very high speed shortly after take off except these two.
However if there are two of the same new plane within months and both share an identical and extremely rare type of crash* it becomes very difficult to blame the pilots and get away with it.
I guess the length of the recertification process indicates the size of the underlying problem. If it were a simple software fix plus retrofitting the warning systems the Max would be flying by now.
*Off the top of my head I can't think of another crash where a passenger plane drilled vertically into the ground/sea at very high speed shortly after take off except these two.
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