‘This response from Boeing is surely very inflammatory. I really think it's high time Muilenburg takes responsibility and resigns. Maybe fire a few middle managers first.’
I watched a BBC Panorama show on the 737 story as known thus far. The issues Boeing faces don’t start anywhere else but at the top of the organization where the profit above all else culture has been driven down into the lower ranks.
Anyone here that’s worked for a large listed company will know the quarterly pressure on execs and business unit managers to deliver ever increasing profits through increased sales, cost reductions, squeezing suppliers, pushing inventory into the channel (so is recorded as a ‘sale’), cash flow optimization and so forth will know about this stuff.
Top management are paid huge salaries and hugely bonused on hitting objectives at almost any cost.
This carries on for a few years until the thing breaks.
I suspect in the final analysis this is what will be found in Boeing. The company is clearly capable of building good airplanes. Unfortunately, an unrealistic reverence for stockholders, quarterly profitability targets and toxic executive incentives all combined to potentially destroy the organization.
Middle management would be the last people I would blame - but given organizational politics, they will probably be scapegoated.
I watched a BBC Panorama show on the 737 story as known thus far. The issues Boeing faces don’t start anywhere else but at the top of the organization where the profit above all else culture has been driven down into the lower ranks.
Anyone here that’s worked for a large listed company will know the quarterly pressure on execs and business unit managers to deliver ever increasing profits through increased sales, cost reductions, squeezing suppliers, pushing inventory into the channel (so is recorded as a ‘sale’), cash flow optimization and so forth will know about this stuff.
Top management are paid huge salaries and hugely bonused on hitting objectives at almost any cost.
This carries on for a few years until the thing breaks.
I suspect in the final analysis this is what will be found in Boeing. The company is clearly capable of building good airplanes. Unfortunately, an unrealistic reverence for stockholders, quarterly profitability targets and toxic executive incentives all combined to potentially destroy the organization.
Middle management would be the last people I would blame - but given organizational politics, they will probably be scapegoated.
I think the people building the planes are the last ones I would blame. IMO managers have a collective responsibility for health and safety. In my view they have power and so must also have accountability. Anyone who was complicit in allowing an unsafe airplane to leave the hangar by commission or omission or incompetence should expect to be held to account.
Gee, too bad this wasn't released earlier? Boeing: The 737 MAX MCAS Software Enhancement
Perhaps pilots might want to discuss the wording of this particular extract:
"There are no pilot actions or procedures during flight which require knowledge of angle of attack."
Latest news in this morning's paper - Tom Krisher, AP: "Boeing changing 737 Max software to use pair of computers"
This may not be news to some, and until substantiated by what better be Senate hearings into the matter is only hearsay - but that doesn't make it false.
Perhaps pilots might want to discuss the wording of this particular extract:
"There are no pilot actions or procedures during flight which require knowledge of angle of attack."
Latest news in this morning's paper - Tom Krisher, AP: "Boeing changing 737 Max software to use pair of computers"
* the whole text notes that "two people" briefed on the matter who spoke on the matter Friday didn't want to be identified because the new software hasn't been publicly disclosed.
This may not be news to some, and until substantiated by what better be Senate hearings into the matter is only hearsay - but that doesn't make it false.
When I listened to Dennis Meulenberger (sp?) at the press conference, he refused to accept blame for the crash (obviously his lawyers would have briefed him to do so - standard practice in any situation like that) but repeated more than once that aircraft accidents arise because of a series of interlinking failures, and part of that chain involved pilot error in the two accidents.
Then I thought about it, and decided, yes he was probably correct but for slightly different reasons i.e. the 'interlinking failures' were more like toxic stock incentives at management level, pressure on the organization to hit unrealistic targets, corner cutting, shipping product that they were aware was not bomb proof, ignoring evidence after the Lion Air disaster etc etc.
If ever there was a wakeup call re how listed companies are run and driven, this is it.
Then I thought about it, and decided, yes he was probably correct but for slightly different reasons i.e. the 'interlinking failures' were more like toxic stock incentives at management level, pressure on the organization to hit unrealistic targets, corner cutting, shipping product that they were aware was not bomb proof, ignoring evidence after the Lion Air disaster etc etc.
If ever there was a wakeup call re how listed companies are run and driven, this is it.
I suspect Boeing is being a bit cagey about AOA info to try and deflect interest in the original problems. The statement as written is possibly true in a literal sense but it’s false in the sense that pilots must be aware of angle of attack even if we may not know the specific value.
From a practical point of view, AOA indicators aren’t put on nearly all jets just for decoration. Additionally the FAA made it much administratively easier to retrofit AOA indicators on certified light aircraft. AOA info is valuable information in stall avoidance and efficient operation. No one procedure may reference AOA directly unless you are a naval aviator but it is as useful as airspeed on approach.
A Boeing 787 just had an engine explosion over Rome and one person was hit and 25 cars and 12 houses damaged from engine parts falling from the sky. Norwegian Airlines has shifted engines on most planes but not this one. They have had trouble with the engine before. A Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engine. Emergency landing went fine.
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Yeah I had to search for it as well. If it is another Trent 1000 failure that is not good news for RR. On the back of the A380 write off they've killed profits for the next few years already fixing that.
I was intrigued to read that the dreamliner is the only plane with common mounts on the engine so you can in theory swap engine suppliers. I suspect practice is a little more tricky but still a move in the right direction.
I was intrigued to read that the dreamliner is the only plane with common mounts on the engine so you can in theory swap engine suppliers. I suspect practice is a little more tricky but still a move in the right direction.
This article is very, very good. Absolutely the best explanation so far of what MCAS actually is. It's written in almost-layman, but not oversimplified... so it's long, but unquestionably worth the time.
seekingalpha.com/article/4286602-boeing-737-max-misconceptions-engineers-view
(you'll have to copy/paste or right-click and search, the link is grumpy)
And when you've digested that, read this.
The inside story of MCAS: How Boeing’s 737 MAX system gained power and lost safeguards | The Seattle Times
seekingalpha.com/article/4286602-boeing-737-max-misconceptions-engineers-view
(you'll have to copy/paste or right-click and search, the link is grumpy)
And when you've digested that, read this.
The inside story of MCAS: How Boeing’s 737 MAX system gained power and lost safeguards | The Seattle Times
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737 MAX may well be ungrounded selectively come November, the EASA isn't the pushover the FAA appears to be : MoA - Boeing Foresees Return Of The 737 MAX In November - But Not Everywhere
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