Official FAA outlet
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206
Please read the linked documents at 11/18/2020 entry
George
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206
Please read the linked documents at 11/18/2020 entry
George
The wretched truth of it seems to be that MCAS was unnecessary from a piloting function anyhow. It was just a way to make the plane “feel” similar enough to previous 737s that the FAA would not insist on expensive pilot retraining. The causes of this perverse incentive need fixing. Heads should be rolling in both Boeing and the FAA and it sickens me to see the FAA guy on my screen all smug about how good the plane is now it is “fixed”.
The cause is, that they installed a modern, over-sized and ultra low fuel comsumption engine in a 1970s airplane without designing a new model for a new engine. The engine hangs so low, it looks like a caricature of an airplane. A lame duck against the long legged Airbus models. But they try everything to make up for the desaster. They gave it new names because people won't fly with the old named models any longer.
The official Congressional report.
https://transportation.house.gov/im...5 FINAL 737 MAX Report for Public Release.pdf
https://transportation.house.gov/im...5 FINAL 737 MAX Report for Public Release.pdf
Last edited:
That’s a rather poor summary of the issue, I think- the technicalities of which have been discussed here ad nauseum - but yes the larger bypass fan engines required a more forward and higher mounting position to clear the runway, which changed the aerodynamic handling properties at higher angles of attack. To retain the series type certification rating, the MCAS* system was developed to “assist” the pilots in automatically correcting for I believe - and 6L6 can correct me on this - potential stalls when the additional lift that the larger engines provided under certain condition exceeded what the pilots certified for and familiar with previous generations in the series would have otherwise have expected.
Fact check, the 737’s first passenger carrying flight was actually a couple years earlier than the 70’s - Feb ‘68 to be precise. Being in production for over half a century before this imbroglio, it has had numerous upgrades / reconfigurations amounting to well over a dozen variants, all retaining the same type certification -which considering the staggering costs borne by the individual airlines for pilot retraining on any new type certification is a fairly important factor to the purchaser/end user.
* Dare I say that such a software solution is not inherently a cheap and nasty band-aid solution to a problem now well documented to be known to engineering and management staff at Boeing- but the manner in which it was implemented and disclosed to the airlines clearly left much to be desired.
Is the recently re-certified plane as safe and predictable to fly as humanly possible - quite likely. How long will it take and what will be the ultimate effect on Boeing’s bottom line to retrofit the literally hundreds already in service and currently idle on the tarmac, as well as those awaiting completion of assembly?
Your guess is as good as mine, but I’m thinking it’s gotta be in the billions.
Last edited:
It's quite a bit more subtle than that, but generally speaking, your explanation is close enough.
The original (implantation of MCAS) "cure" was much, much worse than the actual problem. At which time MCAS itself became the real flaw.
Unquestionably. 10s of Billions at the very least.
Last edited:
The rule book was apparently written before computer assistance was an option. The stipulation of control consistency was meant to address aerodynamic design, and building a frankenstein and fixing it in software potentially deprives us of the benefit of the final level of redundancy, the pilot.
How will things be moving forward, will we learn this lesson and interpret the rules properly, or will they be amended in a way that may eventually lead to all planes being 'corrected' to be identical?
How will things be moving forward, will we learn this lesson and interpret the rules properly, or will they be amended in a way that may eventually lead to all planes being 'corrected' to be identical?
What I don't understand is why they don't put cameras all over the airplanes so that the pilots can see what's actually going on behind them? E.g. so they can see the entire outside of the plane, engines and control surfaces.
I've been watching FlightChannel.com and the number of instances where the passengers can see an engine or control surface issue while the pilots are struggling to figure out what is going on and making mistakes is alarming to me.
I've been watching FlightChannel.com and the number of instances where the passengers can see an engine or control surface issue while the pilots are struggling to figure out what is going on and making mistakes is alarming to me.
Tesla driverless airplane?
At this primitive stage I am inclined to use AS rather than AI as a more realistic acronym (artificial stupidity).
There are plenty of aspects where robotics/AI does WAY better than humans and vice versa. Cute as you may try to sound, there's enormous room for *good* augmentation of the human-machine interface.
6L6 -- aren't Airbus's commercial craft all fly-by-wire now? Please do correct me if I'm wrong but wasn't that system was partially implicated in the Air France crash in the mid-Atlantic? That's not to cast aspersions on the system (I agree with you wholeheartedly that fly-by-wire is the way forward) but more a plea to better training across the board.
Hey, I do sound cute.
I agree that computers have advantages in some areas, for example they don't commit suicide or drink alcohol or have strokes or lack training. That's all good. They can make decisions faster, both good and bad. They don't have the considerably greater intelligence and experience of a trained pilot.
The trouble with 737 Max could be framed as changing the expected behavior of the airplane without the pilots expecting it. With AS you have the problem of introducing counter-intuitive aircraft behaviors and corner-cases that are not tested.
Fly-by-wire is arguably better than mechanical linkages when it is simple and intuitive. When you combine the airplane having the power to "correct" the pilots in un-intuitive ways and sensor failures, then you get these fatal problems. I trust a pilot to make decisions more than an AS system and I think all airplanes should have pilots and they should be able to easily disable AS.
- Status
- Not open for further replies.