Of all I've come across, I think Mohrhoff's view makes the most sense, with a simplicity quite fitting Ockham's razor.
Some references from the Los Alamos National Laboratory electronic pre-print archive:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/find/quant-ph/1/au:+mohrhoff/0/1/0/all/0/1
I've only read this one in detail, and it's a good start, especially for those familiar with Stapp's position which is criticized here (even if you don't agree with this, Stapp is criticized elswhere and his view seems very weird to me).
Of course, I don't agree with everything Mohrhoff wrote, as I've come across some weird stuff he's written (such as this).
Some references from the Los Alamos National Laboratory electronic pre-print archive:
http://xxx.lanl.gov/find/quant-ph/1/au:+mohrhoff/0/1/0/all/0/1
I've only read this one in detail, and it's a good start, especially for those familiar with Stapp's position which is criticized here (even if you don't agree with this, Stapp is criticized elswhere and his view seems very weird to me).
Of course, I don't agree with everything Mohrhoff wrote, as I've come across some weird stuff he's written (such as this).
geoffkait said:
Bohm's understanding of physical reality is moving and profound. His long-time appreciation for such things as non-locality shows, IMO, a sensitivity to probable directions future theory might take.
If you like Sheldrake and Bohm, you might enjoy Ervin Laszlo's The Connectivity Hypothesis. You might also enjoy reading about the emerging field of biophysics; for instance, see Popp's What Is Life? (a title referencing Schroedinger's book of the same name).
Thanks for tips on Mohrhoff and Ervin Laszlo; Sheldrake's speculations in recent book, The Sense of Being Stared At, must be close to some of Laszlo's from what I gather - why pets know when their owners are returning home, and all that. Another more difficult book, one you might know, is Hew Price's Time's Arrow and Archemedes Point, tho more philosophy/rigorous than I prefer. I think it's fascinating that so many big names of "pure science" have headed off into this post quantum theory territory of consciousness/subconsciousness and non-locality.
Sorry, but life is best left to the sole discretion of biology. I am bothered by the arrogance of some physicists making claims outside their field of specialty. Penrose is a good example, and he made a jackass of himself with Emperor's New Mind and Shadows of the Mind. Bringing consciousness into QM interpretations is an unnecessary complication and tantamount to religious anthropocentrism. None of the neuroscientists and psychologists I know, and those I read, see any role for non-classical physics in the brain. Going the other way, Mohrhoff's and other (more mainstream) interpretations do not need the crutch of a special role for consciousness.
Science has made unnecessary supernatural explanations for more and more mysteries originally left to religion and mysticism, and now we can theorize of even how the universe can begin without the need of a creator. In the same fashion, psychology and neuroscience are well on their way of explaining away the mysteries of the mind, without the need for what people like Stapp some other physicists and philosophers are turning into the religion of the quantum mind.
Prune, your notion of "explanation," and your thoughts about leaving life to biologists, is simply not shared by a not insignificant number of top-rate thinkers, not the least because biology is underpinned, historically and by necessity, by chemistry and physics. The history of science, moreover, shows that those who attempt to stretch the bounds of the currently known face many forms of resistance---the greater, to be clear, from established scientists in the field in question. What does that tell you? It tells me, at least, that the "field" is not closed, that the boundaries of which necessarily will change, and that what is now called "biology" will, in 100 years, perhaps be seen in the same manner we view theories of Newton---of rather limited relevance.
Geoff, if I, science neophyte, were to guess the direction from which will come the new science to cannibalize the old, I'd place my money on non-locality as the current exception to prove a new rule. The phenomenon is clearly "unexplainable" by current quantum and relativistic theory, and perhaps stands the chance of relativizing causality as a notion applicable only to a limited set of circumstances within a limited realm of inquiry.
Geoff, if I, science neophyte, were to guess the direction from which will come the new science to cannibalize the old, I'd place my money on non-locality as the current exception to prove a new rule. The phenomenon is clearly "unexplainable" by current quantum and relativistic theory, and perhaps stands the chance of relativizing causality as a notion applicable only to a limited set of circumstances within a limited realm of inquiry.
Heh, I wonder how many of those so called 'top thinkers' are biologists, the people that actually know something about the subject.
Indeed biology, like all sciences, reduces to physics. However, the claim that non-classical effects are necessary to explain the mind is unwarranted by psychology and neurology -- in essence, it's like trying to go in the reverse direction in the reduction chain. Biology needs to draw on chemistry and physics, but physics doesn't need to draw on biology; it's a totally different thing.
Regarding your second paragraph, causality is a psychological invention based on classical intuitions, and not necessary in all QM interpretations. Once again I recommend you read this neat paper; the author does away with causality by replacing it with correlation, and his interpretation is the cleanest I've come across.
Indeed biology, like all sciences, reduces to physics. However, the claim that non-classical effects are necessary to explain the mind is unwarranted by psychology and neurology -- in essence, it's like trying to go in the reverse direction in the reduction chain. Biology needs to draw on chemistry and physics, but physics doesn't need to draw on biology; it's a totally different thing.
Regarding your second paragraph, causality is a psychological invention based on classical intuitions, and not necessary in all QM interpretations. Once again I recommend you read this neat paper; the author does away with causality by replacing it with correlation, and his interpretation is the cleanest I've come across.
Probably the one that is correct will be ignored, discredited and vilified and the one that makes the most sense will wind up being wrong hahah. Not too sure about the proposal that the person with the goods must come from the discipline involved. Sheldrake, one of my favorite examples, as if you couldn't tell, was from theoretical physics background (Cambridge), but many of his theories involve evolution and biology and whatever branch you call extra sensory perception - psychology? The big science types like Penrose and Josephson (I think) might reach the end of their particular road and out of boredom and/or curiosity pursue a different one that they stumble onto somehow, maybe accidentally.
Penrose
What is the objection by his detractors to Penrose? I am not sure I follow either Penrose or his detractors well enough to have a solid opinion, but it appears (from web search) that there are both proponents of and detractors to Penrose (his "quantum consciousness" theories), leading to possibility that Penrose might actually be right and his detractors might actually be wrong, if one were to be democratic about it. Is there some specific argument of Penrose that is usually attacked, or is it the whole idea?
What is the objection by his detractors to Penrose? I am not sure I follow either Penrose or his detractors well enough to have a solid opinion, but it appears (from web search) that there are both proponents of and detractors to Penrose (his "quantum consciousness" theories), leading to possibility that Penrose might actually be right and his detractors might actually be wrong, if one were to be democratic about it. Is there some specific argument of Penrose that is usually attacked, or is it the whole idea?
Penrose has been refuted severely on just about all points.
Specifically, the logical argument that forms the foundation of his house of cards has been explicitly formalized and shown invalid in A Refutation of Penrose's Gödelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence. Another good refutation, which, though less rigorous, has wider scope, can be found here. And you can find more at the usual place for consciousness articles (though some of these are not very good, especially the ones by computer scientists, which pains me to say for I'm also in CS).
Specifically, the logical argument that forms the foundation of his house of cards has been explicitly formalized and shown invalid in A Refutation of Penrose's Gödelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence. Another good refutation, which, though less rigorous, has wider scope, can be found here. And you can find more at the usual place for consciousness articles (though some of these are not very good, especially the ones by computer scientists, which pains me to say for I'm also in CS).
What proponents? Other than the anesthesiologist Hameroff, with whom he developed his biological proposal (quantum computing microtubules, ha!), I can't think of many. And Hameroff seems to me to be on the fringe -- just check out his website. In one article there he even seems to be pushing panpsychism, about as absurd a position as can be. Methinks this bearded anesthesiologist has been hitting the N2O a bit too much. 
I saw at least one (well-written) defense of Penrose on Amazon.com reviews of Emperor's New Mind, in terms of some of Penrose's arguments having apparently been misinterpreted by some detractors. Assume it wasn't Hameroff, I'll go back and check I do see some merit of one opinion that Penrose might be pulling rank (as big science guy) to push his argument (if in fact his argument is incorrect).
I have not read the book, but gather the *main objection* is to Penrose's idea that computers can't duplicate the human mind since it (mind) operates in non-algorithmic ways. That position does not seem very preposterous, to warrent all the squabbling, so I must be missing something.
If panpsychism promotes what I think it does = a "widespread mind" - or "field" - wonder what distiguishes panpsychism from, say, Sheldrake's (bizzare) interperetation of memory or even universal subconscious?
I have some CS under belt, some time ago: Fortran IV -- the DO loop was my favorite tool
I do see some merit of one opinion that Penrose might be pulling rank (as big science guy) to push his argument (if in fact his argument is incorrect). I have not read the book, but gather the *main objection* is to Penrose's idea that computers can't duplicate the human mind since it (mind) operates in non-algorithmic ways. That position does not seem very preposterous, to warrent all the squabbling, so I must be missing something.
If panpsychism promotes what I think it does = a "widespread mind" - or "field" - wonder what distiguishes panpsychism from, say, Sheldrake's (bizzare) interperetation of memory or even universal subconscious?
I have some CS under belt, some time ago: Fortran IV -- the DO loop was my favorite tool
Emperor's New Mind is an old book. He later wrote Shadows of the Mind essentially to reply to his critics. Should have stopped on the first mistake, before making a second embarassing one. Worse, he even had yet a third (short) book, with a collection of essays of his critics (including Stephen Hawking), and his attempt at a reply.
Again, I refer you to A Refutation of Penrose's Gödelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence for a rigorous refutation that leaves no place for ambiguity and claims of misinterpretation. His argument is converted to formal logic and shown invalid. Maybe if Penrose had bothered to do that himself, he'd have seen how far off he was. Really, click on the link and you can see for yourself. That's why, kids, you shouldn't let your ego overtake your abilities and turn into arrogance. Just reading the prose of these Penrose books is pretty revealing of his conceit.
Again, I refer you to A Refutation of Penrose's Gödelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence for a rigorous refutation that leaves no place for ambiguity and claims of misinterpretation. His argument is converted to formal logic and shown invalid. Maybe if Penrose had bothered to do that himself, he'd have seen how far off he was. Really, click on the link and you can see for yourself. That's why, kids, you shouldn't let your ego overtake your abilities and turn into arrogance. Just reading the prose of these Penrose books is pretty revealing of his conceit.
geoffkait said:
To answer your question, probably very little.
By the way, I personally don't find Sheldrake's theory bizarre. Has anyone actually proven that what we call knowledge exists, as it were, in the brain? Isn't a theory, say, that knowledge exists outside the brain, like radio waves outside a transceiver, equally consistent with the current state of our understanding? Such theory is perhaps more than equally consistent because, despite being more complicated (Ockham), it explains certain observations the knowledge-exists-in-the-brain understanding as yet cannot.
Interesting thread guys. I'm reading: The origin of conciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind" by Julian Jaynes.
Anyway, on the subject of where knowledge exists. I think it doesn't exist at all, as an entity. What we call knowledge means that we have experienced a way to solve a particular problem, that we "know" how to solve a particular problem.
What does this mean, "we know"? I think it means that one time we stumbled up an action that solved a problem. That particular connectivity pattern in our brain was kept handy for the next time we would encounter the same or an equivalent problem. We would then call up this pattern and solve the problem. Yes, I am a fan of the Theory of Neuronal Group selection.
My 2 eurocents worth.
Jan Didden
Anyway, on the subject of where knowledge exists. I think it doesn't exist at all, as an entity. What we call knowledge means that we have experienced a way to solve a particular problem, that we "know" how to solve a particular problem.
What does this mean, "we know"? I think it means that one time we stumbled up an action that solved a problem. That particular connectivity pattern in our brain was kept handy for the next time we would encounter the same or an equivalent problem. We would then call up this pattern and solve the problem. Yes, I am a fan of the Theory of Neuronal Group selection.
My 2 eurocents worth.
Jan Didden
"By the way, I personally don't find Sheldrake's theory bizarre. Has anyone actually proven that what we call knowledge exists, as it were, in the brain? Isn't a theory, say, that knowledge exists outside the brain, like radio waves outside a transceiver, equally consistent with the current state of our understanding?"
I said it was bizarre, I didn't say impossible; I like your transceiver analogy, I also think TV transceiver is a good analogy. Pretty interesting that we seem to have ability to replay an entire movie from memory, assuming we've committed it all to memory. We usually recall/replay certain memorable scenes. (If pressed, I'm pretty sure I could recall Shane or Dr. Strangelove or certain Seinfeld episodes in their entirely, or close to it. Well, maybe not every *single* detail intact). Even a lone scene - say a minute's length - when you think about it, that's a whole lot of information/data, when you add up each frame of motion, including colors, details, dialog.
I said it was bizarre, I didn't say impossible; I like your transceiver analogy, I also think TV transceiver is a good analogy. Pretty interesting that we seem to have ability to replay an entire movie from memory, assuming we've committed it all to memory. We usually recall/replay certain memorable scenes. (If pressed, I'm pretty sure I could recall Shane or Dr. Strangelove or certain Seinfeld episodes in their entirely, or close to it. Well, maybe not every *single* detail intact). Even a lone scene - say a minute's length - when you think about it, that's a whole lot of information/data, when you add up each frame of motion, including colors, details, dialog.
Arthur-itis said:
Yes the interesting thing here is how we define problem solving. If I follow Edelman's ideas (to which you may not agree of course) a particular neuronal group connects up in response to an external (or internal, but lets forget that for the moment) event. That leads to a reaction.
If the reaction is "good". for instance, running away when you hear the sound of a tiger, that neuronal connection group is "kept on stand-by" so to say because it was quite succesfull in making the organism survive. That I would loosely call "solved problem", and we now have the "knowledge" how to solve such a problem (a problem of chosing what to do when treatened by a tiger).
In this view, a neuronal connection group that isn't very usefull would not be kept, and cannot be quickly recalled.
So if one followed this reasoning, knowledge would exist not as an entity but as a possible neuronal connected group that would quickly be formed in response to an event. I realise that it still doesn't answer the question HOW that particular group could quickly be recalled....
Jan Didden
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