Undoubtedly, but its 10 years down then line before you would have any number of those in your fleet. If you had been holding off investment for the Max that leaves a big hole in your calculations. If you have to keep older aircraft running for another decade that's a significant profitability hit vs airlines running A320 Neo.
No slight to you, Chris, but any article that starts with "The real reason..." is typically utter simplistic garbage which is easy to digest and overarchingly wrong. This article takes no effort to do quality investigative journalism to highlight the underlying story, in as much of the complex muddiness as the author(s) can uncover. It just regurgitates the popular narrative in video format.
I hate simple storylines. They do everyone a great disservice. (This crap is common in my "field" as well, where everyone suddenly becomes an expert in medicine/diagnostics. I don't pretend to know more than a tiny smidgen of a small subset of the field)
I was about 3 paragraphs into that article and a voice in my head said "private pilot", because his understanding and explanations of the jet rules is flawed enough to make some of his arguments invalid. Generally speaking he has the idea right, but when he starts to sounds detailed and knowledgable there's enough things factually incorrect that it just turns into another alarmist article.
It’s quite amazing how when someone who is not an expert in a field you are familiar with starts trying to explain something technical, they quickly tie themselves up in knots, or display their lack of understanding of the finer details that make all the difference.
Where I worked, one of the PhD’s said he found it ‘funny’ when I tried to understand solid state physics - he was right of course. But a few months later, there was an SMPS circuit diagram on the table from one of our Taiwanese customers and I had to explain to him how it worked. I am no expert in SMPS’s (the last commercial design I did was back in 1989) but I tool pleasure from the opportunity to school a very smart, but somewhat arrogant, guy.
Knowledge is very sticky, does not cross over from one area of expertise into another easily. As for flight control and stability systems on airliners, I would imagine it’s an extremely difficult field with all sorts of nuances you only get from being in the game for years. Best left to experts - even if occasionally they may make a tragic oversight.
Where I worked, one of the PhD’s said he found it ‘funny’ when I tried to understand solid state physics - he was right of course. But a few months later, there was an SMPS circuit diagram on the table from one of our Taiwanese customers and I had to explain to him how it worked. I am no expert in SMPS’s (the last commercial design I did was back in 1989) but I tool pleasure from the opportunity to school a very smart, but somewhat arrogant, guy.
Knowledge is very sticky, does not cross over from one area of expertise into another easily. As for flight control and stability systems on airliners, I would imagine it’s an extremely difficult field with all sorts of nuances you only get from being in the game for years. Best left to experts - even if occasionally they may make a tragic oversight.
I’m not sure I would classify Dennis Muilenburg as a bean counter based on his resume but he was in charge. Was he unaware or was his judgement derailed?
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So Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max. That is big strike No. 1. No, the aircraft was not inherently unstable. In normal flight attitudes and up to high angles of attack, the aircraft behaved normally. The change in CofG, moment and thrust vector caused by the change of engine type meant that the aircrarft handled differently than the previous models.
Boeing then tried to mask the 737’s dynamic instability with a software system. Big strike No. 2. No, they introduced a system to provide similar handling characteristics as the predecessor aircraft when at an unusual flight attitude. The system was also meant to aid the flight crew and move the aircraft away from a dangerous flight condition - not to hide something.
Finally, the software relied on systems known for their propensity to fail (angle-of-attack indicators) No, No, No. Angle of attack *sensors* not indicators. They are sensors not 'systems'. They do not have a propensity to fail. The Goodrich 0861HB for example has a real life MTBF of around 20,000FH.
and did not appear to include even rudimentary provisions to cross-check the outputs of the angle-of-attack sensor against other sensors, or even the other angle-of-attack sensor. They did - but you had to pay for it as an 'optional extra'. (I don't agree with their decision because it could have been the barrier that prevented the accidents)Big strike No. 3.
I suggest the author reads and understands the basics of aircraft engineering, flight stability and control systems if he wants to publish 'informed criticism'. The Jeppersen series of books would be a good place to start. Then perhaps move up to something like 'Aircraft Dynamics and Automatic Control' by McRuer, 'Flight Dynamics' by Stengel and move into 'Flight Dynamics Principles: A Linear Systems Approach to Aircraft Stability and Control' by Cook.
The contribution of the design to the accidents is only one facet of the overall cause. The 'real experts' did not solely cause the accidents.
I was very angry with a friend the other day. His girlfriend asked me what caused the 737 max to crash. Before I could open my mouth he talked over me " Oh it was just a software fault".. To which I said " I hope Boeing are a bit more deep thinking than that. If not we may have more accidents" .She flew to Washington on Sunday so wanted reassurance. She works for the IMF so is no idiot. Whilst he was in the loo I explained centre of gravity and how the new jet engine causes aero effects that make stall more likely. Sorry if I got that wrong. It's the best I could do in the time I had. She is an analyst and got it instantly. Glad someone has put my right about the attitude sensors and reliability.
Any time I hear the word the alarm klaxons in my head go off.With the Comet crashes from memory two things were found. Windows too large with bad ways of fixing. An idea common today of bonding them didn't work. Using screws was a bad choice. Cracks started via problems like this. If I am right unessasary ground level1 bar cabin pressure was used. This made the problems worse. The Comet became a safe aircraft. Alas it lost the chance to make a succession of designs. Someone told me off the other day for living in the past. To which I quote " The one thing history teaches us is history teaches us nothing ". Whilst I don't believe that it is the right to say it. When a hi fi forum no real harm, when life or death a less binary view of things is wise. Boeing benefited greatly from the Comet crashes. Cabin pressure being set lower is the simplest example. I suspect Boeing will not lose public confidence the way the Comet did. Just a software fault like our day to day experience with computers. My central heating has procedures not in the manual for smoother running. I would guess 737 max has reduced time to fix problems due to the new jet engines. That's part of just the software.
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