I am quite sure many electronic engineer can fix their cars if they have to and there are enough chemical/material engineers on this site (remember Sy?) who are pretty adept at electronics. That is not the kind of general engineering knowledge I was talking about. That said, I certainly won't be calling any engineers if I need brain surgery anytime soon.
I spoke about solving very difficult ('wicked') problems that lie across knowledge domains. An entirely different issue.
Take a look here https://dcc.ligo.org/public/0151/T1800133/004/T1800133-instrument-science-white-v4.pdf
Last edited:
Coronavirus induced storage has not been kind to older 737s.
On the news here they speak of possible and actual double engine failure.
737 Emergency AD - YouTube
On the news here they speak of possible and actual double engine failure.
737 Emergency AD - YouTube
Attachments
FINAL 737 MAX Report for Public Release:
https://transportation.house.gov/im...5 FINAL 737 MAX Report for Public Release.pdf
https://transportation.house.gov/im...5 FINAL 737 MAX Report for Public Release.pdf
Long talk, discusses history of programming and quotes Bob Seeger, mentions Toyota, and right here he mentions Volkswagen:
"Uncle" Bob Martin - "The Future of Programming" - YouTube
"Uncle" Bob Martin - "The Future of Programming" - YouTube
Whole thing is very distasteful.
Hope the reports can help bring some modicum of closure to the families impacted by this tragic scenario, must be very hard for a lot of people.
FAA Chief Gives Thumbs-Up to 737 MAX Fixes - WSJ
“I like what I saw on the flight this morning,” said FAA Administrator Steve Dickson, a former Air Force aviator and senior airline pilot, after sitting behind the controls for a two-hour ride over parts of the Pacific Northwest, accompanied by a handful of pilots who work for Boeing and the FAA."
“I like what I saw on the flight this morning,” said FAA Administrator Steve Dickson, a former Air Force aviator and senior airline pilot, after sitting behind the controls for a two-hour ride over parts of the Pacific Northwest, accompanied by a handful of pilots who work for Boeing and the FAA."
That it’s taken this long to get the 737 MAX airworthy is an indication of just how flawed the airplane was to begin with.
I would hope Boeing and Airbus would be going through every craft in their fleets to tease out any and all potential problems.
Clearly, when it comes to managing safety critical products that potentially can cause multiple deaths in the event of a malfunction, there has to be a separation of powers between management and engineering. ‘If it ain’t ready, it ain’t flying’ should be the new mantra and it’s the engineering folk that should do the final sign - off and to hell with the stock market jockeys. Period.
I would hope Boeing and Airbus would be going through every craft in their fleets to tease out any and all potential problems.
Clearly, when it comes to managing safety critical products that potentially can cause multiple deaths in the event of a malfunction, there has to be a separation of powers between management and engineering. ‘If it ain’t ready, it ain’t flying’ should be the new mantra and it’s the engineering folk that should do the final sign - off and to hell with the stock market jockeys. Period.
I think it's like everything else today. Products are made to the absolute lowest quality possible that they can get away with. Consumers are stupid and will continue to pay up for substandard garbage because it's all there is.
I have often thought that it would be disastrous if airplane design went the same way as automobile design. Well here we are.
The main take away from this whole sorry saga is that self-policing doesn't work.
The over-seeing authority can not be allowed to palm decisions off to the management of the company whose product it is supposed to regulate.
As for within the company management should be close, physically and in terms of communication and both must be able to veto decisions of the other.
The over-seeing authority can not be allowed to palm decisions off to the management of the company whose product it is supposed to regulate.
As for within the company management should be close, physically and in terms of communication and both must be able to veto decisions of the other.
To augment, the organizational failures of Challenger provide additional reasons on why it shouldn't only be the engineers that are whistle blowers, as a series of higher up engineers ignored (I'm being generous) the 5 engineers who objected. An external group that has no dog in the fight is really what's needed, which is ostensibly what FAA safety review *should* have been.
Lots of layers to unpeel here. We are all human.
A major objective for Boeing was to bring the Max to market without requiring retraining for certification. This would have lengthened time to market and increased production costs.
I think it's likely that training (or even pilot awareness of the system ) could have averted these tragedies. Remember, the trim system that caused the pilots to lose control was really just a band aid to compensate for moving the engines on the chassis, and using lighter engines.
The fact that the FAA missed all this does not inspire confidence in me. And had Boeing done the right thing and ponied up for training, then these incidents wouldn't have happened. (Or how about if they didn't bring a patchwork product dependent on a big band aid to the market in the first place?)
It must be an independent organization that signs these things off ie the FAA.
But, internally, from what I’ve read, the ‘standards’ in Boeing were increasingly set by the management board to underpin stock valuations ie ‘good is good enough’ mentality.
So indeed there were two major fault lines: 1. money grubbers overriding engineering concerns and 2. Lack of FAA oversight
But, internally, from what I’ve read, the ‘standards’ in Boeing were increasingly set by the management board to underpin stock valuations ie ‘good is good enough’ mentality.
So indeed there were two major fault lines: 1. money grubbers overriding engineering concerns and 2. Lack of FAA oversight
- Status
- Not open for further replies.